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Abstract
Campaign donations are something that scholars have examined for some time, generally
treating these donations as an aggregated explanatory variable. Through technological advances
in computing, size is no longer a limitation that inhibits scholars from using this information in a
robust manner. First, data aggregated at the state level, shows that donations made to the
presidential nomination process in 2008 distributes across the many states in a way that is highly
correlated to the population of the United States. From there, additional sorting methods select
the donors that appear on multiple candidates’ records. A network is then created to show to
relationship of the shared donors of the 17 candidates that participated in the invisible primary of
2007. The results of the network shed light on the idea of the cohesiveness of each party as well
as the potential for a new forecasting measure.
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1
Literature Review
Scholars have been attempting to describe political parties and their functions for well
over a century (Ostrogorski 1902; Michels 1915; Duverger 1959; Aldrich 1995). The initial
literature to the strong party model and then the subsequent scholarly inquires serve as a
testament to the importance that scholars have placed on parties. The depth of this literature
certainly suggests many potential avenues of examination. Yet extensive study has not produced
a consensus for what broadly constitutes a political party.
One general definition of a political party would be a group of individuals that form
around policy interest(s) and seek to win office in order to change that policy (Schlesinger 1994).
There are two points to consider from that definition: (1) the vagueness of policy interest(s) and
(2) the attempt to seek office to affect policy outcomes. Examining the first consideration, it is
rather clear from American politics that the party apparatuses have aggregated over a wide
variety of policy goals. One needs to look no further than the platforms of two major parties to
see the gamut of policies crossing seemingly all issues.
With this widespread diversity, it would make sense that there are different levels (within
the elites, grassroots efforts, get out the vote movements, etc.) that parties can operate on. The
discussion concerning parties in the political science literature dates back to Ostrogorski (1902)
and his basic classification of party functions and structures. One of the first attempts to further
define the levels of parties would be Michels (1915). He ultimately suggested that there were
elected officials for one level of the party and citizens comprising another level within his model.
The notion that there are layers associated with a political party has been further
developed by scholars. Key (1964) advocated an approach that examined parties as a diverse
coalition. This coalition will have members of the parties functioning at the different levels that
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a party could exist. There is certainly the component of elected officials who won office and
now are serving terms in the government. Additionally there are going to be elite members that
comprise the formal structure of the parties that help establish the definition that constitutes each
party. Finally, there are citizens that are mobilized in order elect members to office. The theory
takes a top down approach of defining a party. The scholars that embrace this notion of parties
advocate that the elites drive the party and primarily study that point of concern.
That is not to say the average citizen has little or no input into a party. Ultimately the
interest of these citizens aggregate to form the party platform (Eldersveld 1964). Citizens’
interests are considered with the elites and the aggregation of these ideas establish the prominent
issues within the party. The first past the post, winner take all system that is present within the
United States should dictate that two political parties compete with one another. Page (1978)
suggests that in the American system these interests will aggregate into the two distinct stances
for citizens to choose between. In referring to the American system, Page makes example of the
Republicans and Democrats and the traditional leanings of each party. Even with the
progression of issues, two choices exist for the American public with regards to partisan
cleavages. There have been realignments such as the Civil War and World War II shifts (Aldrich
1995) as well as geographic and partisan changes in support (Levendusky 2009). Rigidity is not
a prerequisite of a political party in this definition, but rather that a distinction between parties
exists at the elite level (elected officials and their respective stances on issues) for citizens to
make a selection between.
A more recent approach to define these levels is the “Three Faces” model (Katz and Mair
1993). These faces describe the various groupings of actors that coexist within the party.
Working from the Katz and Mair definition, the first face would be the party in public office.
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This face is comprised of the people in a political party that have actually been elected to serve in
public office. Obviously, this comprises a very small portion of the population because there are
only a finite number of representative positions that can be won by a party. These elected
members, arguably, play the most important role of a functioning party as they are the actors
fulfilling the policy objective. That is, if the goal of a party is to win office to implement policy,
this face of the party comprises exactly those people that are accomplishing the ends the party is
seeking. This also makes these actors very definable and easy for scholars to examine.
However, these individuals do not represent the entirety of a party. Getting into office is the goal
of more than the individual representative, so the expansion of who is in the party is something
that is accounted for in the other two faces.
The next face to discuss would be the party in central office. This is the formal party that
is made up of people other than the public officials and is where the policy goals and
organization of individuals takes place. These individuals serve in positions that allow for the
party to promote their own ideas as well as properly campaign. In order to achieve effective
electoral ends, there must be in place, especially at the national level, a structure for membership
to operate within. The party must then assemble; aggregating their ideas into a platform that
allows for the members of that party to achieve their goals. This, again, is a very distinct that can
be examined with ease. While these actors provide the human capital as well as the raw
components of the structure, there ultimately is a need for a mobilization effort to bring in
support from the electorate that will allow for the party to maximize success at the ballot box.
This leads to the third face of parties: the party on the ground. This is where the “Three
Faces” model takes rather large expansion in scope. Katz and Mair state, in the initial
description of this face, that the party on the ground constitutes “members, activists and so on”
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(Katz and Mair 1993, 593). The “so on” is where this expansion begins to become less clear.
Members and activists are somewhat easy to define. People that are campaigning or advocating
for a candidate easily fit within this category. However, what a citizen must do to become an
activist needs to be better defined and quantified. Actively working a campaign is simple
enough and people that place a sign in their yard certainly could be considered advocating for a
candidate’s campaign. Also the silent, yet vital, role of campaign donations could conceivably
fall in the activist category. At this point the third face seems to be fitting in more with the Noel
and Robbins (2011) suggestion of parties as amorphous and robust. This could eventually be
taken to include anyone that voted for a party could be considered a member of that party. While
this might be a slight over exaggeration, the lasting impression should be that parties are
certainly more expansive than the first two faces but makes third face massively indefinable and
inherently amorphous. So, there must be a way to better identify this third face. Using the
“Three Faces” model, it is clear that quantifying the third face lies somewhere between the
formal actors and the voting public. And, while this model displays an accurate image of the two
elite levels of parties, there is still room for progress with regards to defining the third face of
parties.
The definition of parties is not limited to the coalition definition. Other models have
been advocated by scholars and warrant further examination. One such model is the responsible
party model that was advocated by Schattschinder (1942). This model sets the framework for
analyzing parties to be placed upon the party functions in government and the expectations that
citizens should have of political parties. Ranney’s Curing mischiefs of factions: Party reform in
America (1975) presents a progression of actions that should be expected of parties. The first
point requires that political parties make policy commitments on the issues of the day. Once
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these commitments are made, the parties must be willing to carry out these promises. The next
point Ranney makes is while the party in office is carrying out these promises, the party that is
out of office must then develop alternatives to the policies. These new policies must then be
presented to the public, in the form of stances from a new candidate, to provide an electoral
alternative to the party in power. This approach involves citizens to an extent but all of the
measurements of the party are still done at the elite level.
There certainly are advantages to examining political parties at the elite level. The points
of inquiry with regards to subject matter can be rather easily defined in terms of the prominent
actors. Additionally, the elite level is the most visible and prominent existence of the party and
is included in this definition. However, the electoral component in both cases is rather simplistic
and does not question the nature of the campaign. So long as the policies of the opposition are
advocated by another candidate, the electoral component of Ranney’s suggestions is satisfied.
The coalitional approach pays little attention to elections as well. Besides neglecting
functions within elections, Aldrich (1995) points out that alternatives, even if they are distinct,
might still fail to resolve the issues of the day. In other words, the difference that is presented by
the other side of the aisle might be no better equipped to resolve an issue of the day. There must
be a model that considers these concerns.
A third approach to political parties presents an electoral context. Members of parties at
all levels (actual representatives, elite actors and the citizens at large) behave rationally in their
goal seeking behavior. The most common goal of these actors is to seek to win office (or
promote their candidate to office). While the motives of the different actors are going to vary
based upon position within the party, all of these actors are going to seek the party winning
office. Also, the institutions that are in place will shape the path to this goal. How to win an
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election is going to be dictated by the rules of the election. The rule do not change the goal
parties have with regards to continually winning election and holding office to enact policy.
A prominent advocate of the position that parties exist with the first goal of winning
office was Downs (1957). Parties that are not in office have little leverage to enact policies to
further that party’s platform. As such, parties are going to be focused on winning election and
reelection. This will then put the focus of the party on the elections. A party will not want to
make a decision on policy that will adversely affect the majority of the membership of that party.
This position has merit even though there has been a change of late that has seen party loyalty
trump the concerns of the majority of a member’s constituents (Masket 2011). Scholars have
framed such thought processes of members of Congress and other elected office to suggest that
elected officials are going to make decisions regarding policy that will benefit (or at a minimum
not affect) reelection (Mayhew 1974).
Within this framework of parties, there is an issue of what causes citizens to support one
candidate over another. There are many approaches that one could take to this question, but the
interest to this study considers that successful politicians are the ones that seemingly have
citizens gravitate towards them. Schelsinger (1991) compares this to Adam Smith’s unseen hand
in economics. In other words, there is a force (charisma, attractiveness, policy ideas, etc.) that is
difficult to account for, but exists and is consequential. These factors undoubtedly exist, but can
be rather difficult to define in terms of what matters and how to measure these intangibles of
elections. The electoral component is something that scholars have struggled with not only in
regards to outcomes of elections but also quantifying and describing the nature of a given
election. That does not take away from the merits of this approach, but rather describes the
complexities of this definition. All three of the theoretical frameworks mentioned before have
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elements that are worthy of consideration and should be applied in constructing any definition of
political parties.
In beginning this search, it is important to work with the definition of parties. The major
factor that distinguishes parties from interest groups would be the use of electoral success to
reach their goals. Therefore, it is wise to evaluate parties on the electoral component. Looking
at national elections would be a useful place for evaluating parties as it satisfies the
distinguishing characteristic and utilizes one of the models. Moving to the elections as a location
to focus on parties, there are some unique problems that present themselves. Working around
the idea people are rallying around some policy interest(s), the question now shifts to: who are
the “people” referred to in the definition?
In attempting to define who the “people” are, it is wise to begin with as narrow a
definition as possible and become more inclusive from that point. The party should be defined
as the people working together to get someone elected to a given office. This definition limits
membership to the party to people that worked on the party’s campaigns by donating time and
providing work to the campaign. These active workers are the boots on the ground and clearly
fit the definition of assisting someone to obtain office.
The major issue that takes multiple forms is the definition is, intentionally, far too
narrow. A political party does not require an individual to provide service to a campaign in order
for them to be considered a member of that party. One would be hard pressed to find a political
party that would reject membership of an average citizen because said citizen fails to actively
campaign. It would be bad electoral politics. The more support that a party can have, the better
the chance that party has of achieving their ultimate goal: electoral success.
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Another difficulty is including a measure on what describes participation in a campaign.
Tangible efforts certainly have a great value and are easy to define, but that is not to say an
individual donating money to a candidate is not providing assistance to that campaign.
Politicians would be remiss in not including a “thank you” to all of citizens that donated to their
campaign, and it would be end of that candidate to think that an election could be won without
monetary resources. This is especially true of the presidency (Brown et al. 1995; Shaw and
Roberts 2000; Adkins and Dowdle 2002). It then makes sense that there should be some
inclusion of all actors participating in more than physical campaigning.
In continuing to grow the pool of citizens that are now members of the party, the next and
largest jump would be to define the party as anyone that voted for that candidate. The reason
this can be done is, logically, the ultimate way someone can assist a party is to get their candidate
into office through a vote on Election Day. Because of this fact, a political party could be
interpreted to be everyone that voted in favor of a party’s candidate. That being said, an
expansion done in that manner is too broad (and essentially impossible to measure and define).
Someone who votes can do so and not have the interests of a party in mind, but rather are
fulfilling their civic duty. There also are issue voters that may go back and forth between parties
who would vehemently protest the idea that they are a member of any party. Split ticket voting
makes for a very real conflict of interest as well. If someone voted for a Republican candidate
for the House and a Democrat for a Senate seat, which party does that individual belong to?
Finally, taken to the extreme, someone that casts a ballot incorrectly becomes a member of the
party despite all the potential campaigning against that candidate that individual voter might
have completed. To say that a vote to help someone into office is the measure to best describe
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who comprises a party has obvious drawbacks. Clearly there must be some trimming done to
this definition of what constitutes a party.
Thankfully, the potential to achieve this goal of shrinking down the definition of a party
could present itself in a quantifiable way with regards to campaign donations. Monetary
contributions to a given campaign are a necessary resource of all campaigns and can also
contribute to the winnowing of the field of candidates (Adkins and Dowdle 2005). A campaign
without any money is in real danger of ceasing to be a campaign (Busch and Mayer 2003).
Therefore, this contribution of money is vital for a campaign’s survival. This all relates back to
defining political parties because it better defines who exactly is being represented in the party
on the ground. Campaign donations are expansive and plentiful. Also, these donations are very
easy to obtain at the federal level thanks to reporting required and disclosures from the Federal
Elections Commission (FEC). This allows for the potential for a database of party activists that
can be useful towards better discussing what a party looks like1.
Donations can serve the purpose of describing a citizen’s support of a candidate. If
someone is willing to give money to a candidate’s campaign it is logical that is a demonstrable
display of support for that candidate. While a survey can have difficulty measuring the
conviction an individual has towards a candidate, the opening of one’s wallet leaves little doubt
there is significant support from the individual to that candidate. It is rather difficult to find
another reason as to why someone would take the effort to give money to a campaign other than
clear support. Unlike the rather low burden of voting, donations allow for a far greater degree of

1

Previous studies (Francia, et al. 2003; Bramlett et al. 2011) have indicated that campaign
donations are not representative of the United States population. The intent of this measure was
to show that there are no regional biases to the process and the campaign donations distribute
evenly across the states. No inference is to be made about the demographics of these donors.
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commitment to be identified and in turn allows for the assumption of a far greater attachment to
the candidate and potentially the party.2
Another useful function of these donations would be that it incorporates citizens who
may not identify with a party into this party model. Keith et al. (1992) were able to show that
many indentified independents are, in actuality, functioning as partisans. Donations allows for
independents to give to a campaign, maintain their self-described label as an independent, yet
still function in a very partisan manner. Also, Hillygus and Shields (2008) displayed citizens
that have weak party ties often constitute a more mobile section of the electorate than
independents. Inclusion of these partisan independents and weak partisans into a party model is
something that would be useful and allows for a more robust analysis of a party.
While contributions have the potential to be very useful, deciding which donations to
include in the examination of this new party definition does require some consideration. The
simplest way to state this argument would be any donation to a candidate is implicit support for
that party. This begins to sound very similar to saying anyone that if one votes for a candidate,
that voter is now a member of the candidate’s party. This was already identified as a problem.
Down the ticket elections, especially at the municipal level, can have a great reliance on party
ties and other ballot cues when it is time to vote (Matson and Fine 2006) and can have a reliance
on heuristics (Lau and Redlawsk 2011). In more plain terms: someone that donates to help to a
mayoral campaign could be donating for a reason that is outside of endorsing the political party
of that mayoral candidate.

2

Certainly there is the potential for the argument that the money could be going to the candidate
and not to support of the party. However, because the candidate is running as (in our cases) for
the party’s presidential nomination, the money is implicit support of the campaign. Furthermore,
analyzing just candidates that are seeking to be the nomination for president for the two major
parties ties candidate to party in the most concrete way possible.
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It is then necessary to then choose donations to campaigns that will tie the donor to the
national party as much as possible. This takes place in the form of donations to candidates that
are seeking that party’s nomination for the office of the presidency. Because the office being
sought is national, the entire country is included in this race. Also, the nomination process
allows for the campaign to have the greatest tie to the party as possible. A candidate that is
seeking the nomination is asking for the party to unite and select that candidate to represent the
party in the upcoming general election. Anyone that is contributing to one of these campaigns is
choosing who will represent the party in the upcoming general election. These contributions
clearly are a partisan activity. These donations constitute a more defined face of the party on the
ground as well as allowing for the party to constitute a very large swath of active participants in
the party.3 Therefore, the expectation is that campaign donations to the presidential nominations
of each party will distribute evenly across the fifty states.
The fundraising patterns of each party have been tracked in previous studies. Previous
studies have found that donations from each party are centered in a similar place in the country
(Gimpel et al. 2006). They found the point of centrality for each party in terms of donations is
located very close to one another. This suggests there should be similar correlations between the
parties and the population of the United States. Also, we expect to find a similar result of home
states and large states (California, New York and Texas) having a greater impact on fundraising
than the other states.
Also, there is a discussion concerning whether one party raises money in a more
homogenous manner than the other. The conventional wisdom is that the Republicans are the

3

For the 2008 nomination process there were 17 candidates across the two major parties from
January 1, 2007 to March 31, 2008. This time window and number of candidates will cover
$462,746,240.82 over 1,457,822 contributions to the various candidates
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party that is accomplishing this feat while the Democrats remain fractured (Mayer 1996).
Reasons for the Democrats being divided date back as far as the formation of the Democratic
coalition as well as the post-McGovern-Fraser rules the Democrats enacted (Kamarck 2009).
Therefore, the expectation is that geographic patterns of campaign donations to the presidential
nominations will present a homogenous Republican Party and a fractured Democratic Party.
Within this newly defined group, there is a subsection of donors that are of particular
interest: multiple donors. There are citizens that inevitably donate to more than one campaign in
the nomination process. The field of candidates will eventually winnow to a point where only
the winner remains. In the interim, there is time for supporters of one candidate to move to
another campaign and assist that candidate in winning the party’s nomination. Again, the
nomination is for the party, so it makes sense then some donors still want to affect the outcome
of the nomination and might be willing to give money again to another campaign. That could
manifest into either movement of support to another candidate in the nomination process for that
party or potentially the crossing over to the other major party. This network of multiple donors
is something that will be useful to evaluate.

Methods
Collecting this data, while time intensive, is thankfully a process that can be repeated
with ease and the access to different candidate’s finances is consistent. This is due to the fact
that the Federal Elections Commission has made the electronic filings of the various campaigns
available to download from their website. These filings will serve as the data for this
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investigation.4 The search engine that the FEC provides for electronic filings is sufficient in
selecting the finances of each candidate. The names of each candidate were placed in a search
and all of the F3P files the campaign had submitted with the FEC were displayed. All files were
downloaded on the same day5 and the most recently amended files for each period were selected.
Our time period in question for the multiple donors was all filings from January 1, 2007 to
December 31, 2008. The FEC requires campaigns to file in the year leading up to the general
election by quarter and once in the election year, the candidates must file monthly reports. This
would mean for the invisible primary, four files were collected for each of the 17 candidates.
These filings are not simply the individual donations, but rather all of the campaigns
finances that were submitted to the FEC. For the purpose of this study, all individual SA17A
lines were selected using Microsoft Excel’s sorting capabilities. These donations were then
sorted into an orderly format that created a consistent database.6 Moving then to mySQLyog, the
cleaned files were merged into one file for each campaign in Excel so that all donations of each
campaign could then be uploaded. Once this process was completed, simple queries were
constructed that would sort each of the donations by state and provide the number of dollars each
state gave to each candidate in the nomination process. These donations will constitute the party
in the electorate in an expansive manner while maintaining a uniform demonstration of support.
The next stage would be to investigate donor movement within this campaign cycle.
Social network theory is the best resource in evaluating this question because of the tools it
4

For the 2008 president nomination process Fred Thompson filed in a paper format rather than
electronically. Because of this, he is omitted from this study.
5
January 11th 2010
6
Before getting to that step, it should be noted that there is a great deal of wealth that could
potentially be available for study that is not being examined. All expenditures of the campaign
are present including hotel bills, airfares and cell phone bills. This information could be useful
for scholars to pursue in the future.
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possesses. Scholars are beginning to recognize this potential as networks panels are included in
the major conferences of the discipline and there has been a great increase in the number of
social network papers in journal articles (Knoke and Yang 2007). Also, the set up of the
nomination process is ripe for evaluation through networks. Candidates represent nodes in a
network of well over a million donations. Each donation can be viewed as a potential interaction
between the candidates. Because the FEC requires a great deal of personal information to be
reported with every donation over $200, this data can be sorted in many different ways. For this
study the question would be which names appear on more than one candidate's finances. These
multiple donors have the potential of describing party movement within each party.
Someone who donates to a given candidate is tied to the other donors of that candidate.
There is no requirement of donors to have any interaction with one another, much like how
parties do not require knowledge of membership of other members. However, anyone that is
donating to nomination campaigns (especially to more than one campaign) is aware of the
various actors and the restrictions, as well as the implications of the donation being made.
Because the candidates and donors are aware of all the actors, this is a valid use of a social
network theory. Aggregating shared donors between campaigns can be useful in describing
movement of support for the actors within the nomination process. This new approach could
measure the political gravitation that some candidates possess. Potentially, this measure could
find the unseen hand of the presidential nomination process because multiple donors within the
presidential nomination process could functionally display party movement and cohesion.
Using social network theory, the potential exists for central actors to be revealed within a
group. There has been considerable effort to discuss the prevailing factors that lead to a
candidate winning the nomination of a party. Early states have been shown to play a sizable role
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in the process (Steger et al. 2004; Taylor 2010) and that early support is critical in this process
(Adkins and Dowdle 2004; Cohen, et al. 2008).7 The invisible primary (Cohen, et al. 2008) time
period is something that is of particularly intriguing interest. The idea is there are elites that are
positioning candidates in the year prior to any election, primary or caucus with any sort of
success has implications on the worth of primaries and caucuses as well as campaign strategies.
A network analysis of the multiple donor network in the invisible primary may shed more light
on this invisible primary and reveal the prominent candidates in each party while simultaneously
describing party cohesion.
Campaign donations harbor a trait that makes them useful for study with this question
because they are easy to weight and essentially equal between one another. While there are
differing dollar amounts, caps that the FEC placed on donations in 2008 were $2,300. In a
process that came just short of half a billion dollars, the weight of these donations can be said to
be more or less equal from one citizen to another. While there might be some psychological
differences between how citizens view the size of each donation, any donation that is made in
this process is going to amount to a value that is indistinguishable from zero for the candidate.
These restrictions make money, unlike endorsements, something that can be seen as having
consistent and equal weighting. Also, the vast number of donations allow for a larger N value
which is an ideal property. Therefore, this network that will be constructed certainly has
potential of adequately describing the invisible primary period.

7

Discussion of how the donor lists were compiled can be found in the appendix.
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Geography Results
The first question that needs to be answered would be whether or not the suggestion of
using individual donations to presidential nomination was a valid measure of a political party.
To do this, census data8 was collected and compared with the two major parties. In order to have
some sort of equal comparison, each state’s population was calculated as a percentage of the
United States population. Also, the campaigns were taken into similar percentages, taking the
candidate’s funds collected from individuals in a state and then dividing by the total funds that
candidate had collected. Each campaign’s total dollar figures for each state were added together
to create dollar amounts for each party during the nomination process. These party figures were
then computed into percentages the same way candidates and the US population percentages
were constructed. Having these figures adjusted, correlations were run to see how close each
party’s fundraising was to one another and the population9.

Table 1
Correlation Table Between the Parties Donations and the US Population
Percent
Percent
Percent
Republican
Democrat
Total
Percent Republican 1
.884*
.943*
Percent Democrat
.884*
1
.989*
Percent Total
.943*
.989*
1
Percent US
Population
.931*
.836*
.887*
*sig at .01 level
N=51
*sig at .01 level

Percent US
Population
.931*
.836*
.887*
1

The results of this test show that there is a strong correlation that is statistically
significant between the parties and population. The Republicans were slightly more strongly
8
9

Census data was collected for the 2010 census
The table of state by state figures was omitted due to size but is available upon request
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correlated than the Democrats to the US population, but only by a small amount. This would
suggest that our assumption of the fundraising of the two major parties in the presidential
nomination process is a national one and that all of the states have influence that is strongly
correlated to the population of that state.
This also supports with the findings of Gimpel et al. (2006) of there being little
geographical difference in fundraising patterns between the two major parties in the United
States. This again suggests that using individual donations in the nomination process will be a
useful measure for describing the party at large and that this new face will be rather
representative in terms of a geographical distribution.
One question that is not answered by this comparison would be if different states have
consistent, yet differing levels, involvement in the process. The party fundraising can be
strongly correlated across many of the states, but there is still the chance that there would be one
or two states that consistently played a greater role in the nomination process. Hinkley and
Green (1996) found that campaigns will rely on previously established networks for funding to
start a campaign. In addition to that Gimpel et al. (2006) find that the large states play a major
role in the resources of a campaign. To examine these hypotheses, a value of how much each
citizen of a state gave to each party needs to be constructed. This will neutralize the population
bias of examining just the raw dollar amounts. To accomplish this goal, the raw dollar total of
each candidate, in each state, was divided by the population of that state. Then, the figures
created were multiplied by 100 in order to show the number of cents donated per citizen for each
campaign.10 This new figure will show the differing participation that the states have on a per

10

Many of the states had values that even after the multiplication were less that one. The goal of
the multiplication was to make the data more diverse and easy to examine.
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citizen basis. Table 2 displays the results of the top 5 states, on a per capita basis, for each
candidate.

Table 2
Top 5 States Per Capita for the Democrats
Biden
State

PC

Clinton
State

DE
DC
MA
NY
PA

PC

Dodd
State

PC

Edwards
State
PC

100.78
34.28
8.17
7.64
6.35

DC
NY
MD
CT
NJ

992.73
160.23
95.27
77.97
77.72

AK
DC
CT
RI
NY

92.3
67.5
60.97
13.55
11.75

NC
DC
NY
CA
CT

Gravel
State

PC

Kucinich
State
PC

Obama
State

PC

Richardson
State
PC

DC
ME
AK
WY
VT

0.34
0.25
0.24
0.18
0.16

HI
NH
OR
CA
WA

DC
IL
MA
VT
CT

972.47
131.62
121.68
120.79
106.67

NM
DC
NV
CO
NY

2.31
2.01
1.73
1.56
1.42

93.04
64.59
16.85
15.58
13.08

281.61
60.11
10.32
8.51
8.27
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Table 3
Top 5 States Per Capita for the Republicans

Brownback
State
PC

Giuliani
State
PC

Huckabee
State
PC

Hunter
State

PC

KS
DC
NJ
NY
FL

14.54
7.68
3.55
3.13
2.97

DC
NY
CT
NJ
FL

69.96
52.58
45.22
43.66
25.36

AR
SC
GA
NH
TX

35.86
7.58
6.53
6.18
5.04

AR
NH
TX
DC
SC

15.07
3.1
2.02
1.77
1.63

McCain
State

PC

Paul
State

PC

Romney
State

PC

Tancredo
State

PC

DC
AZ
CT
CA
NY

164.96
60.37
44.49
39.19
29.54

NH
WY
AK
NV
MT

17.61
13.28
12.91
12.46
11.30

UT
DC
MA
ID
CT

214.83
77.83
65.76
45.45
44.61

CO
MT
AK
SD
CA

4.18
1.15
.91
.91
.77

Thompson
State
PC
WI
DC
IA
VA
CO

5.13
1.83
.43
.41
.33

The findings after this calculation display a rather clear pattern. Of the 17 candidates, the
consistent pattern that emerged was the involvement that Washington, DC has within this
process as well as the role that home states play in various campaigns. Washington, DC appears
in the top five of 13 of the 17 campaigns in the 2008 presidential nomination process. Also, on a
per capita basis, it plays a substantially larger role than any other states with donations totally
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over $20 per citizen. In addition to that, all of the major money candidates11 (Clinton, Obama,
McCain, Giuliani) see DC as their state that contributed the most money on a per capita basis.
This is an interesting contrast with the remaining candidates which had home states, per
capita, providing the greatest support. In 2008, home states of the candidates play a significant
role in supporting the campaigns of the lesser known candidates. Like DC, 13 of the 17
candidates had their home state in the top five with Biden, Edwards, Richardson, Brownback,
Huckabee, Tancredo and Thompson having their home state as their greatest contributing state
per capita.
When this is considered with the Gimpel idea of home state being a major resource along
with the larger state, these findings somewhat support this idea. Certainly, home state is very
important to the campaigns of 2008 to many of the candidates. The vast majority of candidates
saw that on a per capita basis, home states played a disproportionate role in their fundraising.
However, reliance on larger states might need to be adjusted to a reliance on Washington, DC.
Having the backing of the donors in DC in 2008 was indicative of a great deal of money from the
other states as well. It will be useful to examine this idea in other nominations to see if this
measure repeats or if 2008 was an aberration.
Another idea to examine would be if candidates are acting like their peers with regards to
campaigning or is the party defined by the aggregation of regional campaigns. In other words,
2008 saw a strong correlation of each party and the US population. Do the candidates aggregate
to accomplish this feat or is each campaign in and of itself a true sample of the population. In
order to test this question the per capita donations from each campaign will be compared to the

11

Utah was Romney’s top state per capita with DC being second. This is probably a greater
statement about the support that Romney had from the Mormon population in the state than of
Romney’s fundraising pattern.
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per capita of that party. That being said, comparing a campaign to their party is not that simple
because the candidate is a part of that party. Therefore, for each correlation, what constituted the
party was adjusted so that it was the candidate compared to all the other candidates within the
party. This will be referred to a comparison to the candidate’s peers. Results are in Table 4.
Table 4
Per Capita Correlation to
Peers
Democrats

Per Capita Correlation to Peers
Republicans

Candidate
Biden

Candidate
Brownback

Clinton
Dodd
Edwards
Gravel
Kucinich
Obama
Richardson
*sig at the .05 level
**sig at the .01 level
N=51

Correlation
.284*
0.044
.950**
0.000
.516**
0.000
0.526*
0.000
.611**
0.000
0.265
0.060
.951**
0.000
0.180
0.207

Giuliani
Huckabee
Hunter
McCain
Paul
Romney
Tancredo
Thompson

Correlation
.294**
0.037
.536**
0.000
-0.106
0.457
0.017
0.908
.547**
0.000
0.220
0.121
0.268
0.057
0.008
0.958
0.126
0.377

From Table 4, some interesting patterns emerge. The Democrats in 2008 have higher
levels of correlation between a candidate and their peers as well as more candidates that
statistically significant correlation. Clinton and Obama are approaching near perfect correlation
(.981, and significant at the .01 level) between their campaigns and the rest of their party. This
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contrasts with the Republicans where a smaller number of candidates achieved a much more
modest level of significant correlation. The implication from this would be that the Republicans
are operating in a far more regional way with money coming from different areas for the
different campaigns while the Democrats are raising money in a way that is similar to one
another. This would begin to indicate that in 2008 the Democrats were a more homogenous
group than the Republicans. Whether this is a result of regional bias of the varying candidates or
donor patterns of the party as a whole is something that should be pursued with studies of
additional elections.
Another angle to look at these claims would be if the candidates from each party are
getting the same percentage of their money out of each state as their peers. Per capita is a
wonderful display of support per citizen, but not all campaigns are able to raise money at the
same level. The Gravel campaign is in no way going to raise money in the amounts of the
Clinton and Obama campaigns. That being said, if each candidate’s campaign is considered in
terms of how much from each state a candidate is receiving, the two campaigns can be examined
in such a way that they are on equal footing with one another.12 A numerical value can then be
assigned to each state that would represent the percentage of money that state gave to a given
candidate. This can then be aggregated to make a figure that would represent the total money to
a party from a state as well as the percentage of funds that a party had from each state.
Correlations can then be run that allow for the comparison between a candidate and party.
Again, care was taken to make sure that a candidate’s funds were not included in the calculating
of how much money the party has taken in that state by subtracting the dollar total of each
12

For example, if candidate A has a million dollar campaign and candidate B has a one hundred
million dollar campaign, if candidate A has one hundred thousand dollars fundraising money
come from New York and candidate B has ten million dollars come from New York, they will
have the same percent of their campaign funded from New York.
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candidate in a state from the dollar total that each party had for the state prior to calculating the
percentages.

Table 5
Correlation of Percent Campaign to Peers
Democrats

Correlation of Percent Campaign to Peers
Republicans

Candidate
Biden

Candidate
Brownback

Clinton
Dodd
Edwards
Gravel
Kucinich
Obama
Richardson
*sig at the .05 level
**sig at the .01 level
N=51

Correlation
.699**
0
.912**
0.000
.614**
0.000
.557**
0.000
.840**
0.000
.789**
0.000
.897**
0.000
.400*
0.004

Giuliani
Huckabee
Hunter
McCain
Paul
Romney
Tancredo
Thompson

Correlation
0.842**
0.000
.797**
0.000
.545**
0.000
.681**
0.000
.937**
0.000
.889**
0.000
.724**
0.000
.711**
0.000
-0.010
0.946

The findings suggest that there are stronger correlations to donations between candidates
and their parties when equity of the campaign is taken out of the question. All but Tommy
Thompson correlated with their party in a statistically significant way. This can be taken to
mean that each candidate takes in similar proportions of money from each state when compared
to their partisan peers. Before this can be asserted as a more concrete rule, additional elections
should be examined to see if these similar patterns emerge.
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Network Results
Within this nomination process, there is another question that is interesting with regards
to party composition and movement within a given cycle. Over the course of an election, polls
clearly indicate that there is movement in support between the candidates. However, within this
movement there is little the polls can reveal with regards support leaving one candidate and
moving on to another. Just because there is a decrease for one candidate and an increase in
another in the polls, the inference cannot be made that this is support leaving one campaign and
moving on to another. Donations to a campaign allow for the gap to be filled in with regards to
this question. When someone donates money to a campaign their donation becomes a matter of
public record.13 The FEC electronic filings make it so that each donation is a record of who,
where and how much that donation represents. If the same name and location were to repeat
from one candidate’s reports to another, it would be an indication of that donor giving to (and
supporting) each campaign. This relationship is important because sharing donors across
campaigns could be indicative of support moving as the field evolves.
The invisible primary puts forth the idea that the parties are making their decision on who
will win the nomination prior to a single primary or caucus (Cohen, et al. 2008). Primaries and
caucuses are going to be low information where influence amongst elite participants is going to
be highest (Masket 2011). The fluctuation of resources is something that is going to be worth
measuring. Treating the number of donors that are shared between candidates as a proximity
measure between campaigns would serve as a useful measure with regards to this occurring.
This would mean that if a network were to be constructed with the number of donors as a
13

Unitemized donations that were under $200 are not required to be reported. Some candidates
chose not to report these donors while others elected to disclose all donations.
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linkage, the nodes of that network would be the candidates. This is where the hybridization of
the coalition and electoral frameworks takes place. Treating the candidates as high level actors
and nodes in the networks and combining electoral and common support of the multiple donor
should prove to be an interesting measure of both models.
Using this idea, it might then be useful to see if the sharing of donors during the invisible
primary period has and descriptive or predictive value for the 2008 nomination process. A
network analysis was conducted to see what if any patterns emerged. The matrix that was
constructed was a 17 by 17 symmetrical matrix of the candidates with the joint entry
representing the number of shared donors between the two candidates. Also, the diagonal of the
matrix was set to all zeros. The dendrogram and non-metric multi-dimensional scaling below
were constructed from that matrix using the software program UCINET. The graphics that
follow have arbitrary points of the dynamic clustering process pulled from the dendrogram. The
MDS is only displayed and the dendrogram can be found in the appendix.
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Fig 1
The results of the MDS being to display the clustering of candidates within this multiple
donor network. In order to display this dynamic clustering there is the need for multiple cuts to
be made into the dendrogram. It is displaying in a static representation of a dynamic clustering
process. By selecting different points within this clustering process, the strength of different
clusters can be evaluated and it is possible to begin to describe some of the party activity.14 For
the sake of brevity, only the critical clustering moments will be displayed graphically. This will

14

A question could be posed as to direction of these donations. While an interesting
question, for the purpose of this analysis unimportant. In considering the proximity of the
candidates and their support networks, directionality is not important because proximity is the
only consideration. The ideological flexibility to move is the measure that we are using to
describe what is occurring within the party.
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be done by a line being drawn through the dendrogram at the point of consideration. Next, there
will be corresponding circles on the MDS that will show the clusters in two dimensional space.
The compact nature of the graphics is going to lead some questions with regards to the exact
coordinates of the nodes. Those can be found the appendix.
The first clustering can be found in Fig 2 below. The central relationship in this network
would be between Hilary Clinton and Barack Obama.

Fig. 2
This is an interesting clustering considering that this all occurred prior to any electoral
happenings. The momentum that Barack Obama was able to gain with his success in Iowa was
not present in driving these donations. Even though the primary would prove to be long and
seemingly trying for the Democrats, the findings within the invisible primary suggest that the
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party, at the elite multiple donor level, was far more unified than the public’s perception. This is
additionally interesting considering the past scholarship that has suggested that the Democrats
are more divided than the Republicans because of rules and the nature of having a diverse party
coalition (Mayer 1996). Further calculations will be constructed to further test this new, sixth,
hypothesis.
Continuing with the discussion of the dynamic clustering, the next major cluster to
develop would be what is labeled as the Republican cluster. Before that develops though,
another Democrat, John Edwards will join into the Obama-Clinton cluster forming what will
from now be described as the Democratic cluster. Interestingly, the top three candidates in
prowess within the multiple donor network were the three major contenders that the Democratic
Party had vying for their nomination. This signals both the prominence of the candidates within
the network but also an indication of who the major players within the Democratic Party were in
2008.
The next cluster that begins to form starts around Rudy Giuliani and Mitt Romney.
These two candidates have many similarities in terms of background that can go towards
explaining why they would be such a strong cluster within the Republican nomination process.
Both come from holding office in affluent states in the Northeast and both are seen as moderates
within the Republican Party (Norrander 2010). At this point in time two clusters have developed
where what would prove to be the three major contenders in the Democratic nomination and two
of the more prominent figures within the Republican race.
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Fig. 3
With two clear groupings developing by party the thought might be that the Republicans
would be accepting John McCain into the next grouping, making each party balanced in number.
As Fig. 4 demonstrates, this does occur. John McCain the eventual winner of the nomination
joins the Republican cluster at this stage creating a balance, at least in terms of number of
candidates in each cluster, between the two parties. It should absolutely be noted though that the
Democratic cluster is stronger than that of the Republicans as the Democratic clustering occurs
first. The sequence displayed by the dendrogrpah is demonstrating that rather clearly. What can
be made of that is the cohesive nature of this clustering and that the Democrats are more united
in the invisible primary periods than the Republicans in terms of sharing multiple donors.
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Fig. 4
In describing the progressive clustering, the next candidate to enter a cluster is Joe Biden
entering the Democratic cluster followed by Chris Dodd entering into the Republican cluster (see
Fig. 5). Biden entering the Democratic cluster is not too much of a shock. He was one of the
senior members of the Democratic Party within the Senate and his run for the nomination was
going to get him some support from the party. The surprising finding is Chris Dodd entering into
the Republican cluster. This is the first instance of cross party merging within the 2007 network.
The most logical explanation for this would be the regional bias that is present for the
Republican cluster. Rudi Giuliani and Mitt Romney being the center of the Republican cluster,
and Chris Dodd being from that region could conceivably go to explaining these findings. And
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that is the case as roughly a quarter of multiple donors in this first Republican cluster come from
New York, New Jersey, Connecticut and Massachusetts.

Fig. 5
Moving along with the dynamic clustering, Bill Richardson joins the Democratic cluster
of candidates. This would mean that currently there is a cluster of five Democrats and another
cluster with three Republicans and one Democrat. More information will be needed to make any
statements regarding this stage of the clustering process. That being said, the next group that
beings to cluster within this network would be the candidates Deacon Hunter and Tom Tancredo.
Both hail from western states and were seen from the onset as long shot candidates. Creating
this new third group within the network is an interesting finding. One would think that the

32
traditional two party cleavage that was developing would play out to be the case between this
multiple donor network. In addition to the Dodd to the Republicans surprise, now there is a new
cleave developing with regards to the Republican Party.

Fig. 6
This again is an interesting finding if one considers the propencity to return home for the
general election could be dictated by this support moving within this pre-primary process. For
theoretical reasons stated before, ideological flexibility is something that can be inferred from
giving across two campaigns. If there is a divide within the party there could be issues on the
horizon in terms of party cohesion. This thought will be further investigated following the
discussion of the clustering process within the network.
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Continuing with the process of describing the clustering, the next candidate be join a
cluster would be Dennis Kucinich into the Democratic cluster. There is little surprise with this
as Kucinich was seen as liberal ideological candidate in this race. It would make sense that he
would be joining the cluster with the Democrats, just later in the process. The next clustering to
occur is a critical point and is displayed in Fig. 7.

Fig. 7
As Fig. 7 clearly shows, the Republic and Democratic clusters are no more. The two
party cleavages have merged and now a fringe Republican cluster now is left in comparison to
the rather large, Democratic-Republican cluster. This is implying that the multiple donor
network within the invisible primary process in 2007 saw a blurring of the two major party
before the lesser candidates were included into the network. At this stage in the clustering
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process, there is no longer a purely Democratic/Republican cleavage. Additionally, Mike Gravel
is the only Democrat remaining in this process that has yet to been absorbed into a cluster. That
being said, he is such a minor candidate that he only has 451 donors and 20 shared in the
network. By comparison, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton alone share 2269 donors between
themselves. His candidacy is so small in comparison to the other actors that his omission from
clustering is not a byproduct of alienation from the party, but the obscurity of his candidacy.15
The argument could be presented that the candidates that are clustering are then
clustering simply because they have a numerically superior number of donor and the probability
that someone would cross to another party is just simply higher. This is not the case as Ron Paul
has five times the number of donors of Joe Biden (26,746 to 5,575) yet Joe Biden shares five
(654 to 187) times the number of donors within the network as Paul. Those candidates in the
main cluster certainly have a numerical advantage in terms of funds, but that still does not
account for the clustering to be non-uniform between parties. When this is compared to the
Republicans there are still several prominent Republicans that have failed to come into either
cluster. Mike Huckabee won states in the primary process and still has not joined into the now
uni-party cluster. Ron Paul falls into the same territory as Huckabee at this stage of clustering
despite remaining in the primary process for an extended period of time. So, for the
Republicans, the second and third to last candidates to drop from the field have yet to join into
the invisible primary network in 2007. In addition to Paul and Huckabee, Tommy Thompson
and Sam Brownback are yet to join a cluster as well. This again goes to demonstrate that the
Republican multiple donor network is not joining with either party and presents a question of
cohesion.

15

More will be discussed later in terms of number of donors and shared donors.
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The question that now remains with this clustering process is how the remaining
candidates enter the network. The two possible outcomes could be that each candidate moves
into the main cluster in a uniform manner including the small second Republican cluster. The
alternative to this pattern would be that the lesser candidates add into the small Republican
cluster. The case that presents (as seen in Fig. 8) would be the latter in 2007. Sam Brownback
and Ron Paul join the lesser Republican cluster followed by Mike Huckabee joining the major
cluster before the two remaining cluster merge into one large cluster. The implication is that the
lesser Republican candidates have more in common with one another than the Republicans that
are part of the major cluster.

Fig. 8

36
A great deal has been made about the differing patterns of clustering between the two
parties. Considering the two parties simultaneously can be somewhat confusing and the could be
additional factors in computing proximity that need to be taken into consideration. Therefore,
there is a need to consider each of the party networks as existing in a vacuum. That is, a matrix
of shared donors will be compiled and that network will contain candidates only of one party as
the nodes. If the full matrix is correct in describe how the two parties are cluster, the expectation
would be that the Democrats cluster in a rather uniform manner and that the Republicans will
come together in a more fractured and disjointed way.
The Democrats have the step by step cohesion that was expected. The Clinton/Obama
cluster was the first to form with the candidates that followed to come in a similar pattern as to
how they clustered into the complete donor network. The question now would be if the
Republicans, once isolated, maintained a fractured pattern or if separating from the complete
network would display a more unified party than the complete donor network implied. The
Republicans to be fractured as predicted by the complete network. The Republicans are very
fractured and the clustering pattern is indicative of that assessment.
Two prominent clusters of Republicans emerge. The first would be that the frontrunners
that were first to form in the complete donor network. Giuliani and Romney begin to cluster
followed by McCain entering into the same cluster. The next step in this clustering was the
forming of the Hunter and Tancredo cluster. Now with two clusters developing, Huckabee
enters the first Republican cluster joining the three frontrunners. After that occurs, the next and
final clusterings that occur would be the merging of Brownback and Paul into the Hunter
/Tancredo cluster. Thus, the two clusters that are now present within this Republican only
network could not be more clearly divided. On one end the moderates and contenders form into
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a foursome. The other end comprises more of the ideological fringe and conservative candidates
within the party. The formation of these clusters was not uniform like the Democrats and could
then be indicative of a lack of party unity. These claims will be tested later in this study.
Before moving to the final consideration of party unity, there needs to be some discussion
with regards to magnitudes of the campaigns. There is a valid statistical concern that the number
of donations that are coming into the frontrunners in the race should make them the most likely
to have the greatest number of shared donors. A candidate cannot share donors that he or she
does not have. In order to take this into account, Table three provides the number of donors that
are shared within the network. While the number of donors is somewhat proportional, upon
further examination it is just not sufficient in explaining the differences in the two parties. For
example, Rudi Giuliani has almost 8,000 more donors than John Edwards. Yet, Edwards
contributes around 800 more donors to the multiple donor network. The Biden and Paul
comparison was previously made, but the same is true in almost all the comparions. Dennis
Kucinich has a comparable number of donors to Sam Brownback but contributes almost three
times the number of shared donors as Brownback. Chris Dodd shares almost seven times more
donors within the 2007 multiple donor network than Mike Huckabee even though Huckabee has
almost a 1,000 more donors. Finally, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama share 500 more donors
with one another than any Republican shares with the entire network (including both Obama and
Clinton). All of these comparisons illustrate a pattern that is emerging. Irrespective of the
number of contributors that a given candidate has, the sharing of donors is not explained by just
probability and having a great many donors. There is also a clear party cleavage in examining
the differences between parties. The Democrats are sharing their donors with the network and
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one another a great deal more than their Republican counter parts.16 The multiple donor network
has a great deal of descriptive power in accounting for the cohesion of the network. In the 2007
invisible primary race, there is a clear break.

Party Unity Analysis
The invisible network in 2007 serves as an interesting point of consideration for scholars.
Because social network theory is applicable, the element of cohesion can be analyzed and an
element of party unity could be examined. However, this unity that is being examined has
somewhat of a limited use in terms of conclusive party unity. There can be an inference from the
multiple donor network in 2007 as to how the party will come together in the general election.
The assumption would be that as a party shares more donors in the invisible primary, that party
will have an easier time unifying and there should be a greater number of donors that come home
in the primary period. The network would suggest that this is the case; it is not conclusive.
In order to examine this implication from the network, additional analysis is required.
There first must be some care taken in selecting the dates that each file was collected. The 2008
primary race for each party took different paths. The nomination of John McCain has some
resistance, with two other candidates winning states in the process. However, by March it was
clear that McCain was going to represent the Republicans in general election. The Democrats
had fewer competitive candidates, but they did not have their race reach a conclusion until much
later in the process. In fact, it was not until June 3rd of 2008 that the Democrats selected their
candidate for the general election.

16

The table that contains the sharing within each party can be found in the appendix.

39
So far in this data set we have analyzed the preprimary period. That means that all of
2007 donors have been accounted for and a uniform opportunity of time has been maintained.
Having two different time periods of the primary season makes for a decision to be made with
regards to how long the general election was as well as if to include the primary period of not.
With regards to the latter, the primary season is going to be excluded from this analysis. There
are too many competing variables to consider with regards to donating that could skew
contributions. The question that this cross referencing is posing is how the party unifies in the
general election. Therefore, the primary period has candidates within a party still fighting for the
nomination and the party is still divided at this stage and there is little or no unification of party
taking place. Therefore it makes little sense to evaluating the primary period with regards to the
research question that is being posed.
An additional benefit to excluding the primary season is that it allows for the periods that
are being cross reference to be as uniform in competition. The preprimary process has no
winnowing occurring so all candidates have the same amount of time to raise money and
compete for the nomination. Cross referencing the funds when one candidate remains makes it
so that the periods in question have complete party infighting against what ideally is a unified
party. Or at least a party that is unified as possible.
There is still one more consideration to make with regards to selecting the timeframe for
which the general will be evaluated. As mentioned before, the length of each primary was
different. Each party had competition into March and both races were over by June 3rd. So
certainly the files from January 1st to April 1st will be excluded and June 1st through the election
will be included. The questionable file then will be John McCain’s April file. Including the file
will allows for McCain to have an extra month to raise money within this process. Excluding the
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file could exclude some of the donors that are unifying with the party. For the sake of this study,
the uniform time is going to be more valuable and therefore the April file of McCain will be
considered part of the primary process and will be excluded from the cross referencing. If a
donor wants to give to John McCain to support him in the general election in that close
proximity to the primary, the chances are that person already gave as his win became all but a
sure thing in March. So, eliminating the element of time is going to be the most valuable for the
sake of examining party unification. Additionally, the periods that are in question will allow for
total party division (the preprimary with all candidates competing) to be compared to a time that
the party should be the most unified.
In comparing the two periods against one another, the same database software will be
used. This software will condense the records from June 1st of 2008 to what the candidates
classified as their pre-general records. Both John McCain and Barack Obama collected more in
terms of donors in this time period by a considerable margin. The general files of each candidate
were cross referenced against each file of the preprimary for every candidate. The results are in
Table 7 for McCain and Table 8 for Obama.
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Table 7

McCain
Cand's
Donors
McCain
Total
%McCain's
%Cand's

McCain
Cand's
Donors
McCain
Total
%McCain's
%Cand's

McCain
Cand's
Donors
McCain
Total
%McCain's
%Cand's

Biden
Brownback Clinton Dodd
Edwards Guiliani Gravel
15
31
27
53
5
2690
0
5575
116356
0.01
0.27

2831

60702

6275

28710

116356 116356 116356
0.03
0.02
0.05
1.10
0.04
0.84

116356
0.00
0.02

36332

451

116356 116356
2.31
0.00
7.40
0.00

Huckabee Hunter Kucinich McCain Obama Paul
Richardson
210
63
0
6034
13
25
45
7262

1580

2863

116356 116356
0.18
0.05
2.89
3.99

116356
0.00
0.00

Romney Tancredo Thompson
2216
39
5
37096

3384

431

116356
1.90
5.97

116356
0.03
1.15

116356
0.00
1.16

36601

76829

26746

17689

116356 116356 116356
5.19
0.01
0.02
16.49
0.02
0.09

116356
0.04
0.25
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Table 8
Biden
Brownback Clinton Dodd
Edwards Guiliani Gravel
458
1
6184
120
5518
20
8

Obama
Cand's
Donors
5575
Obama Total 464011
%Obama's
0.10
%Candidates
8.22

Obama
Cand's
Donors
Obama Total
%Obama's
%Candidates

Obama
Cand's
Donors
Obama Total
%Obama's
%Candidates

2831 60702
6275
464011 464011 464011
0.00
1.33
0.03
0.04
10.19
1.91

28710
464011
1.19
19.22

36332
451
464011 464011
0.00
0.00
0.06
1.77

Huckabee Hunter Kucinich McCain Obama Paul
Richardson
1
2
375
81 32011
118
441
7262
1580
464011 464011
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.13

2863
464011
0.08
13.10

36601 76829 26746
464011 464011 464011
0.02
6.90
0.03
0.22
41.67
0.44

17689
464011
0.10
2.49

Romney Tancredo Thompson
13
7
2
37096
464011
0.00
0.04

3384
464011
0.00
0.21

431
464011
0.00
0.46

There are many levels at which the unifying of each party can be examined from these
tables. The first would be to what extent donors that gave in 2007 that gave to the winning
candidate, donated again in 2008. The law allows for even the max donors in the primary to give
again in 2008 so all donors in 2007 could conceivably give again in 2008. When these numbers
are considered, Barack Obama is more successful by a great deal in magnitude in having his
donors give to his campaign. Obama has almost five times (32,011 to 6,034) donors that gave
both the general and primary campaigns. That being said, Obama had a great deal more donors
in both periods. Therefore, magnitude is not the best comparison because this discrepancy could
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be explained by probability of having the two different size pools from which donors are coming
from.17 To take this consideration into account, the percentage of each candidate’s pre-primary
donors that gave in the general must be measured. Again, Obama is superior to McCain by a
considerable measure (41.67% to 16.49%). More than double, in terms of percentage, of
Obama’s pre-primary donors gave again in the general. Remembering back to the invisible
network, the central actor was Obama. It is not an unreasonable expectation that he would be
able to generate support for his general election campaign from his supporters in the pre-primary.
And, with his central actor status, it is not unexpected that he was able to raise more than his
competitor in the general election.
The next topic to examine would be how the party came together in the general election.
If the multiple donor network is correct, there should be more Democrats giving to the Obama
campaign more than any other candidates in the pre-primary time period. In looking at the
tables, this is exactly the case. The most shared donors between the pre-primary period and
general would be between Clinton and Obama with 6184 donors shared. This is roughly three
times more than the 2269 that were shared in the pre-primary period. So, despite the appearance
of a divisive and long fought out primary on the Democratic side, the early Clinton supporters
had no difficultly coming home and giving again to Obama in the general election. In fact,
10.19% of donors that gave to Clinton in the pre-primary gave to Obama in the general election.
That is more than any Republican gave to John McCain both in terms of magnitude and
percentage.
John Edwards donors moved to Obama in the general almost in the same number as
Clinton. Obama received money from 5,518 of John Edwards pre-primary donors in the general
17

In other words, it would be expected that there would be more 1’s rolled on a six sided dice if
there were 10,000 rolls compared to number of heads on10,000 coin flips.

44
election (19.22%). That means that for every five donors to Edwards pre-primary campaign, one
of them gave to Obama in the general. This is a remarkable display of cohesion within the party
and would be indicative of Edwards support being willing to move over to Obama in the general
election. By comparison to McCain in terms of percentage, more donors that gave to Edwards in
2007 gave to Obama in 2008 than McCain’s pre-primary donors doubling down on McCain.
Edwards did have fewer donors, so McCain had more donors give to him again, but that number
is only 516 donors, or .4% of the McCain general donor pool.
In moving to the McCain campaign, the success that McCain has with getting the donors
of his competitors in 2007 to give again to him in 2008 was much less than his Democratic rival.
Giuliani had 2,690 donors(7.4%) move to McCain in 2008 and Romney had 2,216 (5.97%) of his
donors do the same. This is much smaller both in terms of magnitude and percentage in
comparison to Obama. If magnitude could account for extra excitement for Obama in the
general, it certainly does not explain away the percentage differences that the campaigns saw
with regards to getting other candidates donors to give again to him in the general election. It
appears that on this front the multiple donor network was correct in the prediction that the
Democrats would have an easier time in getting their donors to come home in the general
election.
This pattern holds true as the lesser candidates of each party are consider. No remaining
Republican had even 4% of his donors move over McCain in the general election. This
compares with the Democrats who had 8.22% Biden donors move and 13.1% of Kucinich donors
come home in the general election. Interestingly enough, Ron Paul actually five times (118 to
25) donors switch to Obama rather than come home to the Republican candidate.
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In examining all of the candidates, the pattern once again emerges that the Democrats are
more likely to bring their own into their general candidate’s campaign than their Republican
counterparts. While the major Republican candidates did have their donors move in a major way
towards McCain (about 170 donors to McCain for every Obama Donor), they are not nearly what
happened with the Democrats and Obama. For every Edwards donor that switched over to
McCain, there are 1,103 donors to Obama. Clinton has almost 230 donors to Obama for every
McCain donor. When the magnitude of the number of donors is considered, this gap widens
even more. What the ratio of donors illustrates is again the strength of the Democrats with
regards to retaining their donors and keeping them loyal to the party.
The Paul finding points to a need to address party defection rates in the general election.
The number of party defectors is something that would worthwhile in conversations regarding
party unity. Table 10 shows the results of the party defectors in the general election.
Table 10
Republican
Defectors
Democrat
Defectors

Republican
245 Donors
Democrat
158 Donors

152263 %Defecting

0.16

199094

0.08

Defecting

The first point to make is how few of the donors that gave in the invisible primary gave to
a different party in the general election. This is a strong indicator of party support as the
Republicans, who gave the most away in terms of magnitude and percentage, gave away less
than two tenths of a percent of their invisible primary network over to the Democrats. That
being said, again the Democrats displayed a stronger party unity that the Republicans, retaining a
greater number both in terms of percentage and magnitude.
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New supporters are another point of consideration with describing the party. Certainly
defection rates must be accounted for, but new additions to the candidate’s donor network has
explanatory value as well. A little extra care must be taken here, removing the candidate’s
donors from the pool of this new support group. The results are displayed in Table 11.
Table 11
Republican
Supporters
Democratic
Supporters

Republican
5279 Donors
Democratic
13222 Donors

115662 %Supporting 4.564161
122265 %Supporting 10.81422

Once again the data show that the Republicans are having a more difficult time gathering
up support for the donors of the other campaigns (by a 3:1 margin in magnitude and a 2:1
percentage). As with all of the measures that have been discussed already, this indicates that the
Democrats have a much stronger network of donors within this invisible primary process than
their Republican counterparts. That strength early on seems to go a great deal towards
explaining why the Democrats would enjoy more success in the general election as well.
The fractured Republican multiple donor network predicted that the Republicans would
have some trouble getting the other candidate’s supports to switch in the general, but this level of
difficultly was not expected. Certainly, the donors that gave to Paul that did give again in the
general represent less than 1% of Paul’s pre-primary donors. That being said, while small in
number, the fact that more went to the other party’s candidate is a finding that is surprising and
cannot go unnoticed.
When examining the results of each table, a clear pattern develops that confirms the
utility of the multiple donor network. Not only do more Democrats come home in terms of
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number in the general election, but as a percentage of donors in other campaigns in 2007, a
greater percentage of donors of each campaign come home.

Discussion
In evaluating the multiple donor network, it is clear there are many potential uses that are
applicable in the nomination process. First, the network, prior to any vote being cast, correctly
predicted the eventual winner of the general election as the central actor. Also, clear party
cleavages developed throughout the dynamic clustering process revealing the Democrats to be
far more uniform than the Republicans. Using that as a point of inference, it would be expected
then that the Democrats would come home in greater number than the Republicans in the general
election. This was exactly the case. Because the Democrats donors were coming home in
greater number than the Republicans, the success that the Democrats enjoyed in the general
should not be too much of a surprise.
In how this tool can be used in the future, scholars would be wise in considering this
network approach in evaluating parties. It provides a nice hybrid of hierarchical elite model and
the amorphous elections model. Also, in evaluating the results of the general election against the
network, the forecasting potential of this approach should not be ignored. Not only in terms of
getting the winner correct but also for looking at how the party is going to coalesce in the general
election. The divisive primary literature has had conflicting results in terms of accounting for
different instances of success in the general as correlated to a divisive primary. This network
should be useful in that regards because a party that is already divided at the multiple donor level
before a vote is cast is one that is expected to remain divided in the general regardless of how the
primary unfolds. The state of the party is something that is of such a massive scope that a quick
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primary should not undo the party division. This network approach will both reveal division but
also display cohesion as well.
There is also room for the discussion of a typology of clustering that manifests in the
invisible primary. In 2008, there are two distinct patterns that emerge. That is not to say that
these are the only two conceivable patterns that could present. A discussion of these two
patterns in addition to the other patterns that could develop is a worthwhile discussion.
Of the two patterns in 2008, the Democrats have a rather clear and orderly clustering
pattern. The Obama/Clinton clustering occurs and then the remaining candidates follow in a
rather clear stepwise pattern. This is going to have minimal drain on the network as there is no
competition for resources. This lack of competition is indicative of a network that is going be
cooperative and ultimately, ideal, in the party aggregating for the general election. 2008 for the
Democrats also had two very distinct candidates that were central to the network. Because there
were two central candidates, with the others falling in line behind, the party is in what would be
an ideal position for aggregating. This should present a party that is going to be rather united
behind these two candidates should one go on to win the nomination. Also, there is no counter
group that develops to challenge the central actors within the network. No group that is
competing within the network is going to be helpful in the eventual aggregation of ideas within
the party in the general election.
This contrasts nicely with the Republicans in 2008. While there was a central cluster that
developed with some of the more prominent candidates, there later was a distinct clustering that
competed with the first Republican cluster. That clustering pattern contrasts with the Democrats
when the lesser candidates begin to clustering within the network. The Republicans have a
second clustering of the lesser candidates begin to develop in their network. While these
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candidates might have been lesser in stature than the main clustering, they still represent a
sizable segment of the party in terms of theoretical and ideological support, but also in terms of
donors. Ron Paul had 22,746 donors on his roster yet shared fewer than 1% within the network.
This is something that is not ideal because having a large segment of the network that is more
isolated than any other network is going to present problems when the general election. The
factions that will not join into the party are going to be in competition with one another for
support.
As the divisive primary literature has shown, competition within the party is not going to
be purely indicative of the eventual outcome of the general election. This would suggest that
there is a difference between a contested and a divisive nomination. Purely by optics one would
think that the Democrats process in 2008 would be more problematic than the Republicans. The
Democrats seemingly had two distinct camps and the race lasted much longer than the
Republicans. That being said, the invisible primary network is a challenge to that notion. The
results of this study clearly show that prior to a single vote in the primary, there was already
unity between the Clinton and Obama donor base.18 This network measure then should be useful
for scholars in considering the state of the party prior to the general election because it will
bypass the sensationalism that can be found in the media when covering the nomination process.
That is something that is important because the state of the party going into the party is unlikely
to have any major shifts, especially towards unity, within the primary process.
In discussing these two network possibilities, there are other network types to consider.
One other hypothetical circumstance would be a party that has many closely tied frontrunners

18

The claim that could be made is that the Democrats were equally excited for each candidate as
either would be a landmark first for an underrepresented demographics. Other elections will
need to be evaluated to test this claim.
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that are unable to distinguish one candidate from another. This network would show a tight
clustering of multiple frontrunners that are taking up the majority of resources within the
network, yet one distinct central actor does not manifest. Lacking this central actor, the network
is serviceable, as the interparty competition is limited, yet there aggregating might be more
difficult because there are more viable camps that must unite with the party. Also, the eventual
winner would have to overcome a perceived enthusiasm gap. The reason for the assumption of
this enthusiasm gap exists is the inability of that candidate to pull away from the pack and make
their candidacy the clear choice early on in the primary process. On a whole, this network is not
as ideal as the frontrunner, stepwise clustering because there is the potential for more camps;
however, it is preferable to have divisions within the party.
One final alternative to consider with hypothetical networks would be if there is no
discernible or weak clustering. A network could present itself with weak ties that ultimately
appear as noise to whoever is evaluating this network. Having a party that has very limited
connections on this multiple donor level would be the worst case scenario for a party. The lack
of sharing is indicative of a party that has distinct camps and opinions on which candidate should
be the eventual nominee. Displaying an inability to share donors prior to the primary process is
going to be problematic for a party once it eventually selects a nominee to compete in the general
election. The expectation is that the party will rally to the nominee, however, while votes matter,
just having the base of a party show up will not give the party a win in the general election.
Therefore, the noise model is the least desirable for the party, as a party that is unable to display
any unity is one that is beginning to cease to be a party. The label group lacks serious value
when that group ceases to be homogenous in action and opinion.
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In summarizing the ideal patterns of clustering of multiple donors, the best case for a
party would be candidate’s donors moving to support a clear frontrunner in a normal, stepwise
pattern. This allows for the greatest chance of party unity and also presents a signal for whom to
rally to in the general election. Next in strength is the network that has many indistinguishable
frontrunners. Unity is still present but there is the potential for a lack of signally and support in
the general election as the electorate has a greater enthusiasm gap than the frontrunner model.
Next, the case of factions within the party would present in strength. Having competing factions
are not ideal for a party as there is a resource drain. However, competition of groups at least has
the potential for some rally effect between candidates, whoever the eventual nominee is, which
could provide some help in the general. The ideological chasm is still a greater issue than the
lack of signaling in the general and therefore is less desirable for the party. Finally, the noise
modeling is the worst case scenario for the party. Having no unity and clustering presents a
party at odds with one another. The lack of sharing of resources is problematic for the party and
even begins to call into question the viability of the party. A party that exists only as a label will
struggle electorally and should have poor results in satisfying the electoral component of the
definition of a political party. Additional study of other elections will be needed to evaluate
these assumptions of these typologies of the multiple donor network.

Future Research
The 2008 presidential nomination process and election were historical on many fronts.
Aside from the obvious characteristics that made this election cycle unique (Box-Steffensmeier
and Schier 2009), there were also advances in technology that made for a greater availability of
data for scholars to examine, especially with regards to campaign donations. There are some
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limitations that looking at one election has with regards to drawing any conclusions that can be
used, either as a descriptive or predictive in nature. Because of this fact, there are many avenues
that scholars should examine to see if 2008 was indicative of a greater pattern through all
elections or if these findings were unique to this given election.
The first question that should be examined would be the distribution of donations in
2008. The distribution of the donations being correlated to the United States population makes it
so that this is indicative of a truly national process. It could then be said that these donations are
a fair reflection of the party at large, thus redefining the third face of politics in a more definite
and quantifiable manner. Conformation of this idea with other elections would be useful.
Additionally, the pattern of having a campaign’s top state on a per capita basis be either
the home state of that candidate or Washington, DC needs confirmation from other elections. In
addition to other elections, it would be interesting to see if these patterns existed in early time
periods as this could be indicative of who would be getting support from the most active party
members. Both questions will be useful to examine.
The regional nature of the Republicans is something that is useful for scholars to examine
as well. It would be interesting to see if this description of the Republican Party can be applied
to other elections to the Republicans or to the party that failed to win the presidency. This could
be another source of forecasting that scholars would find useful. However, for claim to be made,
other presidential nominations must be examined.
Also, it would be interesting to examine if raising money like one’s peers has any bearing
on success for that candidate in seeking the nomination. Having a high correlation between
donations to an individual’s campaign and the remaining candidates in that party seemed to be
indicative of party health as a whole as well as a precursor of success for that campaign. It
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would be interesting to see if that manifested again in other elections or if 2008 was a unique set
of circumstances.
Finally, it would also be useful to examine the predictive nature of the multiple donor
network in the invisible primary. The fact that the invisible primary network in 2008 was very
accurate in reflecting the results of the nomination process would serve as a useful measure for
scholars to examine going forward. With one election being cross sectional in nature, it would
then be useful to have other invisible primaries to examine to see if these patterns are present in
the other elections.
The presidential nomination process is germane to elections, the presidency, parties and
the political behavior. Because of the advances in information, and the availability of the new
data, it is a worthwhile endeavor use this process in as many ways as possible. In the case of the
2008 election, the donations that take place within that cycle seem to provide useful information
to the nature of the parties as well as the campaign strategies within each election. Finally, there
might also be some predictive value that comes out of this nomination process not only to the
nomination itself, but also to the general election. Because of the diversity of these findings,
additional research will be useful to see if 2008 was truly a unique election or if it fits within a
pattern of other elections.
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Appendix
Research Notes
To accomplish this task the database software in Microsoft Office was employed. Access
has several wizards by which data sets can be condensed and linked to one another. The first
task was to condense files down to the donor. In other words, if someone were to give twice
their name would be two entries on the candidate’s donation roster. This can be resolved
through a wizard that would condense the names of the lists of each candidate’s donor list. Next,
relationships were constructed between each candidate’s files that would allow for names to be
cross referenced, identifying which individuals appear on more than one list for each candidate.
The three considerations that must be met in order to make this list would be shared first name,
last name and address. This would then account for anyone that gave multiple times. Some
error is to be accepted as someone that moved during this time period would be excluded from
this study, however, this number is expected to be rather small. Once each candidate was cross
referenced against one another then number of shared donors between each campaign could be
accounted for. A symmetrical matrix was constructed using each of the 17 candidates with
shared donors representing the shared value of two candidates.
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Corresponding Dendrogram to Figures 1-9
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